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Abstract
The main argument of this article is that there has been a significant develop-
ment in Muslim acceptance of democracy in Indonesia. By comparing two 
generations of Muslim intellectuals, this paper shows the congruence between 
the decline of the Islamic political agenda with the rise of a new Muslim gen-
eration often dubbed as liberal Muslims. I argue that there is a significant role 
played by this new Muslim generation in advocating and promoting the idea 
and practice of democracy. By developing Islamic arguments in dealing with 
the modern political concepts mostly imported from the West, they are able to 
vindicate the compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy.
The Growing Support of Democracy
Since the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia has conducted two parliamentary 
elections which have been considered by many observers to be the most 
successful and the most democratic elections since 1955. These two general 
elections reveal a promise that Indonesia will become strongly a demo-
cratic state. Jimmy Carter, a former US president who observed the 2004 
general election, was very much impressed by the success of the event 
(International Herald Tribune, 15 July 2004). Likewise, the weekly magazine, 
The Economist, pointed out the same general election as a 'shining example 
of Muslim democracy' (The Economist, 10 July 2004). The success of the 
2004 presidential election is not only because it was held peacefully, in 
spite of the devastating bombing in the Australian embassy eleven days 
earlier, but also because it was held fairly and democratically. 
As a matter of fact, the last two general elections in Indonesia do not 
only reveal a prognosis of democracy, but also evince the surprising fact 
about the development of Islam in Indonesia. Judging from the result 
of the two general elections, Indonesian Muslims, we might say, are 
politically becoming more moderate and more rational. That is to say: 
they are no longer obsessed with Islamic ideology which previously 
predominated in their minds. In the 1950s, Muslims who supported 
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Islamic ideology were almost half of the population. This was revealed 
in the 1955 general election where about 43 percent of them voted for 
Islamic parties. Islamic parties are those parties that espoused Islamic 
ideology (identified by endorsing the Islamic state and the application of 
Islamic law or shariah) as their political garb. However, since the last two 
general elections, this condition has changed dramatically as all Islamic 
political parties obtained no more than 17 percent of the total votes.1
Certainly, supporting Islamic political parties or endorsing the idea of 
Islamic state does not necessarily mean that Muslims during the 1950s 
were against democracy. As a matter of fact, many of them, particularly 
the modernists,2 claimed to have worked and struggled for democratic 
life in the country. Only that the democracy they favoured was that kind 
of what David Collier and Steven Levitsky call 'democracy with adjec-
tives' (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Committed to and strongly inspired 
by Islamic ideology, those Muslims established what they call 'Islamic 
democracy' or 'theo-democracy', which ended up excessively concerned 
with Islamic interests. Like many other kinds of democracy with adjec-
tives, Islamic democracy seriously ran into trouble, particularly with 
regard to the issue of pluralism and minority rights in the country.
The 1999 and 2004 general election have disclosed that Indonesian 
Muslims are no longer concerned with the aliran politics or ideological 
stream. In fact, they now find it more convenient to express their political 
aspirations in various political parties. In the past, political domain in 
the country was sharply determined by what is called 'aliran.' The santri 
Muslims, that is Muslims with a religious background, were unlikely 
to affiliate to secular parties as they were branded as secularist politi-
cal vehicles. Secular parties were mostly supported by abangan or those 
Muslims who embraced Islam nominally. As the platform of political 
parties was strongly ideological, the affiliation of its members was thus 
strongly driven by the aliran groups. 
Apart from that, in the last two decades, Indonesian Muslims have 
enthusiastically been involved in various democratic activities. Islamic 
organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) have 
actively been supporting the empowerment of civil society and the proc-
ess of democratisation in the country. Even more importantly, Muslim 
leaders from both organizations have been enthusiastically engaged in 
the intellectual and political discourse to effectuate a more moderate and 
more liberal Islam. Hence, not only were they were against the idea of 
Islamic state or the implementation of Islamic laws, but also endorsing 
a more moderate and 'secular' platform of the state.
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The question is, naturally, why all these happen in such a biggest 
Muslim country? Why Indonesian Muslims, despite several 'Islamic' 
terrorisms that bashed the country quite recently, are generally more 
moderate and tend to abandon their old ideology? This article is mainly 
designed to answer this kind of questions.
The Emergence of New Muslim Generation
Many writers and observes hold a view that the decline of Islamic politi-
cal parties in the last two general elections in Indonesia is greatly due to 
the Soeharto's policy towards Islam. Since he ruled the country, Soeharto 
was extremely anxious about the ideological divergences inherited from 
the former regime. He saw that ideological conflicts were not conducive 
for the national integration as well as for the economic betterment of 
the country. Thus, during the first decades of his rule, he set an agenda 
of unification and development. Initially, he banned the communist 
party (and communism in general), disallowed Masyumi, the old and 
the biggest Islamic political party which was banished by Soekarno, to 
be rehabilitated, and fusing all political parties into merely two parties. 
He himself supported Golkar, a quasi-political party, founded by the 
military.
Soeharto was a Javanese abangan, who had little interest in religion. 
Many Muslims even saw him to be hostile towards Islam. During the 
first decades of his rule, he forbade any Islamic political parties, deni-
grated Muslims as extremists, and forced them to accept the sole basis 
of Pancasila, an act that was regarded by many Muslims as an intrusion 
into their Islamic creed. However, not all santri Muslims were against 
him. Already in the early 1970s, there grew a new generation of santri 
Muslims who were arguably more favourably disposed to work with 
Soeharto's agenda of development than to follow suit the old path of 
their elders. However, it must not necessarily be understood that they 
had simply been coopted by Soeharto. As a matter of fact, many of them 
were independent intellectuals and were critical of the regime.
Those intellectuals, variably known as 'new Muslim generation' (Ef-
fendy 2003), 'Muslim renewalists' (Hassan 1980), 'Muslim neo-modern-
ists' (Barton 1995, 1997), and 'liberal Muslims' (Qodir 2003), have made a 
radical shift from the old Islamic political paradigm. Mostly educated in 
religious and secular institutions, they are proficient in both Islamic and 
Western knowledge. Unlike their elders, this new Muslim generation 'was 
less concerned about old issues, about the schism between Orthodoxy 
and Modernism, or about the difficulties of living within an increasingly 
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multireligious society' (Ricklefs 2001: 343-44). As far as the delegitima-
tion of Islamic ideology is concerned, their role is no less significant than 
Soeharto. In fact, to a great extent, they are more cogent than any other 
factors. Genealogically, the new Muslim generation comes from a santri 
background and many of them are descendants or relatives of Masyumi 
and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 
Some of them were active during the early period of Soeharto's rule, 
and some other emerged during the 1980s. Mohammad Sjafaat Mintaredja 
(b. 1921) and Abdul Mukti Ali (1923-2004) were examples as of those 
who were active during the early period of Soeharto's rule. Both served 
as Ministers in the first Soeharto cabinet, as Minister of Social Affairs and 
Minister of Religious Affairs respectively. However, among the early 
Muslim reformists, Nurcholish Madjid is perhaps the most articulate and 
daring intellectual in delegitimizing the old Islamic ideology. 
Born into a strong santri family, Madjid was confident to speak about 
Islamic reformism. In 1970, he wrote and delivered a paper entitled 'The 
Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integra-
tion of the Ummah' (Madjid 1970). This paper took the country by storm 
and caused an enduring controversy within the history of Islamic political 
discourse in Indonesia. Madjid's role is indeed important since he had laid 
a theological foundation for the unstoppable Islamic reformism. One of 
the most provoking thoughts he introduced in the article was his appeal 
for Muslims to refuse the Islamic politics which had dominated Muslim 
political thought during the last two periods. His slogan 'Islam Yes, Is-
lamic Party No' had soon become the brand of all his reformist thoughts. 
Although Madjid's ideas were initially attacked from every corner, his 
essential message that Indonesian Muslims must differentiate between 
religion and politics (this was the soft version of 'the separation between 
religion and the state') was widely received. 
The wave of the delegitimation of Islamic ideology reached its culmina-
tion in the mid 1980s, when many from a new Muslim generation came on 
to the political stage. It was a coincidence that during this time a number 
from the new Muslim generation had just graduated from their study 
abroad. Madjid himself had just attained his Ph.D. from Chicago Univer-
sity. Muhammad Amien Rais and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, two towering 
leaders who then became the chairmen of Muhammadiyah successively, 
also graduated during this time, from the same university with Madjid. 
A growing number of Muslim intellectuals played their significant role 
during this time too. Intellectuals such as M. Dawam Rahardjo, Kun-
towidjoyo, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Munawir Sjadzali, and Abdurrahman 
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Wahid (the future President), lived out their productive years in writing 
and developing Islamic thought during this particular time. 
We will see how do they play their role, particularly in developing 
Islamic argument vis-à-vis political changes in Indonesia. And how 
different they are from the old generation of santri Muslims in dealing 
with political issues? 
Muslim Earlier Standpoint vis-à-vis Democracy
As I have said, the older generation of Indonesian Muslims were not 
against democracy. In fact, most of them wanted their country to be 
a democratic state. However, their understanding of democracy was 
fundamentally limited by the values of the classical Islamic political 
doctrines they subscribed to. For the older generation, democracy was 
not incompatible with the idea of an Islamic state. In fact they believed 
the Islamic state in its original form to be democratic. Thus, based on this 
understanding, they developed a new concept of what is called 'Islamic 
democratic state' or what Muhammad Natsir—one of the proponents 
of this concept—called 'theo-democracy.'3
The Muslim understanding of democracy was at first, procedural (of-
ten called 'electoral democracy'). That is, democracy was understood to 
be a viable mechanism to elect the political leader, to control the leader 
(through parliament), and to invite people's participation (by involving 
them in the democratic institutions). They believed that as a procedural 
concept, democracy is compatible with Islam, since Islam, they argued, 
has a similar concept (such as shura). Zainal Abidin Ahmad, a prolific 
author of this generation, argued that Islam is a democratic religion and 
has once experienced democracy in its early history.4 Ahmad pointed 
out the democratic life in the time of the Prophet and his four successors 
(khulafa al-rashidun). According to him, during this time, Muslims lived 
out their political life in a democratic way. That is, they had a meeting 
place which resembled modern day parliaments. They also effected out 
a political transfer of power that could be equated with the idea of a 
general election in the modern era (Ahmad 1956: 111).
As a procedural concept, democracy is also compatible with Islamic 
political doctrines. The Old Muslim generation found that some Qur'anic 
verses clearly encourage Muslims to hold a process of deliberation or 
shura (The Qur'an 42:38; 3:159; 2:233). Likewise, classical Islamic politi-
cal doctrines have a lot of political notions comparably similar to the 
modern political concepts, such as imamah, ahl hal wa al'aqd, and bay'ah. 
In addition to this, there are also many Prophetic traditions (hadith) 
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indicating the democratic life in the early history of Islam. The succes-
sion of the four caliphs was often exaggerated as the ideal type of the 
democratic implementation in Islam.
Furthermore, the old Muslim generation understood democracy as 
majority rule. That is to say, democracy allows the majority to rule and 
govern the country. The majoritarian argument was frequently used by 
the old Muslim generation to justify their political aims. Arguing that 
Muslims are the majority in the country, it is thus democratic to allow 
Muslims to determine the form of the state. This argument has been 
prevalent since pre-independence. The call for a state founded upon 
Islamic basis in the BPUPKI meetings,5 for example, was based upon this 
very argument. Likewise, the recurrent demand of the Jakarta Charter 
(in which shariah must be implemented at state level) was based upon 
the same argument. 
As a matter of fact, the argument of majority rule is actually pre-
sumed since it was mainly based on a Muslim assumption. It was 
entirely grounded on the demographic reality of Indonesian Muslims. 
Politically, Indonesian Muslims were (and are) not monolithic and they 
cannot be unified into one political aspiration. Suffice to us to mention 
the 1955 general election where Islamic fundamental aspirations (rep-
resented in Islamic political parties) were supported by less than a half 
of the population.
The old Muslim generation used to consider democracy as 'people's 
sovereignty.' And this idea was often contrasted to that of 'God's sover-
eignty.' They did not use this conflicting subject of sovereignty to reject 
the concept of democracy, but to limit it. For them, democracy is ac-
ceptable as long as it does not harm the laws of God. There are certain 
things, they argued, that cannot be discussed democratically. Muham-
mad Natsir explained:
Somebody will perhaps ask this question: Is Islam undemocratic? We 
answer: Islam is democratic in the sense that it is against dictatorship 
(istibdad), against absolutism, and against authoritarianism. [Democracy] 
does not mean the parliament's decision to abrogate [the legal status of] 
gambling and pornography and as to whether the myths (khurafat), idolatry 
(kemusyrikan), etc., should be discussed democratically. No! This is not the 
right of Parliament to discuss. (Natsir 2001: 89)
For the old Muslim generation, democracy cannot be removed from 
religion. In fact, its existence must be aimed at serving religion. Demo-
cracy which is not guided by religion tends to be secular and thus against 
Islam. They strongly opposed to the idea of political secularisation. 
38  The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 20•2004
Luthfi Assyaukanie
The old Muslim generation also tend to ignore the substantialist mean-
ing of democracy. This can be seen, for example, from their attitude to-
ward the issue of political equality and the rights of minorities. Equality 
is one of the fundamental pillars of democracy. Equality in democracy 
means that all citizens are treated equally and all of them have the same 
political rights. Basically, most of them were aware of this. They fully 
understood that equality is one of the cardinal principles of democracy. 
However, if we take a look at their writings and their political attitudes 
towards the non-Muslim rights, the discriminative impression cannot 
easily be ruled out. Natsir was frank in his attitude toward this issue. 
In one of his essays, he wrote:
I hope people will understand if we say that those who are non-Muslims 
cannot be appointed as leader, that is as vertrouwens persoon as ulil amri of 
Muslims in their struggle to establish an Islamic state. If we say so, we do 
not mean that we are provoking or inflaming, or such as this. We just do 
this because we follow the teachings of our religion. (Natsir 2001: 56; cf., 
Natsir 1969: 183-190)
Obviously, the old Muslim generation were heavily influenced by the 
classical Islamic political doctrines. The classical view on the status of 
non-Muslims is notoriously discriminatory. Classical books on Islamic po-
litical theories since al-Mawardi (972-1058) to Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) 
clearly distinguish political community between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims (dhimmi). The current attempts to reinterpret these doctrines seem 
to have failed. Zainal Abidin Ahmad, for instance, criticized the classical 
distinction of community into dhimmi and non-dhimmi. He reinterpreted 
the concept of dhimmi into just a mere sociological concept for admin-
istrative purposes, which can be compared with the modern political 
categorization of citizenship.6 However, when he dealt with the political 
leader, he applied the classical distinction. He said that all members of 
non-Muslim society have equal rights as citizens, including in politics, 
economic matters, and even in the military (Ahmad 1956: 65). 'Only one 
position', Ahmad argues, 'that is not allowed to be held by non-Muslims, 
that is the position of caliph or the head of state' (Ahmad 1956: 64).
Seen from a liberal democratic point of view, such an attitude is 
problematic. First of all, because democracy needs an independent and 
objective condition. A political system or a state which is dominated by 
religion would not run democratically, since religion is subjective. It is 
even more problematic when a particular religion claims that it is better 
and more eligible to rule than the religion of other communities. This and 
other aspects of 'undemocratic' views became the main target of criticism 
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launched by the younger Muslim generation. With critical analysis they 
were able to question the political doctrines advocated by their seniors.
New Arguments for Democracy: Rejection of Islamic State
The new generation of Muslim intellectuals believe that Islam is com-
pletely compatible with democracy. Their relationship to liberal demo-
cracy is aptly described in a statement made by Rashid Ghannoushi, the 
Tunisian Islamist leader: 'If by democracy is meant the liberal model of 
government prevailing in the West, a system under which the people 
freely choose their representatives and leaders, in which there is an alter-
nation of power, as well as all freedoms and human rights for the public, 
then Muslims will find nothing in their religion to oppose democracy, 
and it is not in their interests to do so' (Esposito and Voll 2001: 114). For 
the new Muslim generation in Indonesia, liberal democracy is the best 
model of polity human beings have ever produced. They believe that 
democracy will enable Muslims to fulfil their religious obligations and to 
undertake their faith in this modern world. In other words, democracy 
is not only good for governing the secular human life, but also good for 
fulfilling the spiritual dimension of life.
Based on such a conviction, the new Muslim generation argue that an 
Islamic state is no longer relevant for Muslim political life. What they 
mean by 'Islamic state' is that political model previously supported by 
the older Muslim generation either under the disguise of the concepts 
of 'theo-democracy' or 'Islamic democratic state.' They are not interested 
in this kind of ideas simply because such ideas ultimately harm the true 
meaning of democracy.
It is important to note here that the concept of Islamic state was never 
openly criticized by the older generation of santri Muslims. Even the 'lib-
eral' intellectuals like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara7 or Mohammad Roem8 
were cautious as to how to criticize this concept. Roem launched his 
very careful criticism only late in 1980s, in a response to Amien Rais's 
statement about the issue. As I have said elsewhere, during the 1950s 
criticism of an Islamic state mostly came from the abangan Muslims who 
were affiliated to non-Islamic parties. Before 1970, it was simply unim-
aginable to see an Islamic leader criticizing this concept, since it would 
damage his or her credentials. Besides that, almost all santri Muslims 
were affiliated to Islamic political parties whose ultimate target was to 
establish an Islamic state (or more accurately a state based on Islam). 
The rejection of the concept of Islamic state began in the early period of 
the New Order. One of the earliest Muslim critics of the concept was Mu-
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hammad Sjafaat Mintaredja.9 Mintaredja argues that Indonesian Muslims 
were not likely to establish an Islamic state, not only because Indonesia 
is a pluralist country in which its constitution does not allow them to do 
so, but also because the idea of an Islamic state is theologically unten-
able. The Qur'an and the Hadith, the two most authoritative sources of 
Islam, according to him, do not have the doctrine of an Islamic state and 
the Qur'an does not request Muslims to specifically establish a particular 
model of polity (Mintaredja 1976: 85). Mintaredja deplores the political 
strategy of Masyumi which so much emphasizes the ideological aspect 
while ignoring the more important aspects directly felt by Muslims, such 
as economic and welfare problems (Mintaredja 1976: 62). The economic 
issue, according to him, is not less essential than the ideological one.
Mintaredja's criticism of the Islamic state is part of the Islamic reform-
ist campaign that has been started since the second half of the 1960s. 
Nurcholish Madjid, although he did not speak specifically about the 
Islamic state, is well known for his role as the staunch critic of Islamic 
ideology. His severe criticism of Islamic political parties and his notori-
ous slogan 'Islam Yes Partai Islam No' was an indirect criticism against 
the predominant discourse of the Islamic state at the time. However, the 
most conspicuous and forthright critique of the concept of Islamic state 
has actually only begun during the early 1980s, when more and more 
Muslim intellectuals launched their criticisms of the concept. 
The most creditworthy figure initiating this movement was Amien 
Rais.10 The story began in November 1982, when an Islamic magazine, 
Panji Masyarakat, published its interview with Rais. Shortly after, the 
interview was published with a bombastic title 'Islamic State Does Not 
Exist' (Panji Masyarakat, 1 November 1982), the issue went nationwide. 
Responses came forcefully from its readers. The rubric 'letters from 
readers' of the magazine had for weeks been occupied by comments 
towards the interview, both  pro and con. According to Syafii Anwar, 
the editor of the magazine, the edition which reported the interview 
was quickly sold out and many people contacted the magazine office to 
ask for more copies (Anwar 2002). One of the most important responses 
was the article written by Mohammad Roem, a leader of Masyumi, 
published in February 1983 (Panji Masyarakat, 11 February 1983). Sur-
prisingly, Roem supported Rais's statement, although he did it quite 
carefully. This is most probably because Roem did not want to insult 
his Masyumi friends.11
In its turn, Roem's article was unexpectedly responded to by many 
Muslims, more probably because the article was shocking to them, as 
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Roem was known as the eminent leader of Masyumi which during 1950s 
was part of those who struggled to uphold the idea of Islamic state. One 
of the most important responses came from Nurcholish Madjid who 
was then a Ph.D. student at the University of Chicago, the United States. 
Madjid sent a long personal letter to Roem, expressing his compliments 
and thanks for writing such an inspiring article. Roem was soon replying 
to Madjid's letter, and for six months the two intellectuals from different 
generations established a correspondence discussing current issues of 
Islam in Indonesia. Several years later, their letters were published and 
soon became an important source for the Islamic political discourse in 
contemporary Indonesia (Madjid and Roem 2000). 
In the interview, Rais stated that the aim of nation formation was to 
promote welfare and justice. Islam does not specifically mention how 
exactly such welfare and justice should be promoted. The Qur'an and 
Hadith only give guidelines while the details are given freely to human 
beings. He writes:
Islamic State or negara Islam, I think does not exist in the Qur'an as well as 
in the Sunnah. Therefore, there is no desideratum in Islam to establish an 
Islamic state. What is important is as long as a state has maintained Islamic 
ethics, social justice, and bringing about an egalitarian society which is far 
from exploitation of man over man or group over group, it is then, according 
to Islam, considered a good state. (Rais 2000: xxii)
Rais criticizes countries that are using Islam to define themselves but 
do not exemplify model states. He points out as an example how Saudi 
Arabia claims to be an Islamic state but reflects a very bad image of Islam. 
In fact, the monarchist system that it adopts, Rais argues, contradicts 
the very basis of an Islamic political system (Rais 2000: xxii). Thus, for 
Rais, an Islamic state does not depend upon the name alone, but rather 
on how it can comply with justice, equality and prosperity.
Rais's open rejection of the Islamic state was very important for the 
development of Islamic political discourse in Indonesia. Not only be-
cause he is the leader of Muhammadiyah, the second biggest Islamic 
organization, but also because Rais was often regarded as a Muslim 
activist of the Masyumi stock.12 Rais's breakthrough has paved the way 
for other Muslim intellectuals and leaders to go in the same direction. 
Thus, subsequent to him, we see Munawir Sjadzali come on to the 
stage with the same tone.13 Although he was older than most Muslim 
intellectuals in his generation, Sjadzali became involved in the Islamic 
intellectual discourse some time later. This was mainly because he was 
working as state officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Only af-
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ter he was appointed as Minister of Religion was he more sensitive in 
dealing with Islamic issues. 
Sjadzali's criticism of the concept of an Islamic state had actually 
begun in 1950, when he, under the pseudonym Ibnu Amatillah, wrote 
a brochure on the question of the Islamic basis of the state (Ibnu 
Amatillah 1950; cf., Assyaukanie 2004). At this time, he was, however, 
only questioning the concept without explicitly challenging it. His more 
serious criticism and objection to the concept of an Islamic state was 
made only in the mid 1980s, when new Muslim intellectuals, promoted 
by such thinkers as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Syafii 
Maarif, and Amien Rais, played their role. Concurrently, Sjadzali was 
appointed as Minister of Religion. Because of this, he wrote several 
articles and one book which became his monumental work (Sjadzali 
1990).14 Like Rais, Sjadzali argues that the Qur'an does not specifically 
ask Muslims to build a particular form of government. There are many 
things in this world to which religion does not have an answer. Islamic 
jurists have divided human issues into what is called mu'amalah (worldly 
activities) and ibadah (pure devotion). While in ibadah, Muslims are re-
quired to stick to the religious doctrines, in mu'amalah, they are given 
flexibility and freed to do what they think to be good. Political matters, 
Sjadzali argues, are part of mu'amalah (Sjadzali 1990: 204).
Sjadzali criticizes Muslims who over-idealized the history of Islam in 
that they imagine the early life of Islam, particularly in the time of the 
Prophet and the first four caliphs, to be an ideal model to which every 
Muslims should emulate. He severely criticizes the Pakistani thinker, 
Abu A'la Maududi, for his idealistic exaggeration in depicting the early 
Muslim political community:
With our respect to Abu al-A'la al-Maududi as a devoted Muslim fighter as 
well as a productive writer, I have forcedly to say that his views of Islamic 
political system have many flaws and contradictions. He looks at the 
history of political life of the guided caliphs (al-khulafa al-rashidun) seems 
to me as if he was looking at Merapi mountain. He looks at it from a room 
balcony at the level six of the Ambarukmo Hotel, Yogyakarta. From such a 
place, Merapi is indeed a beautiful mountain, particularly if we see it in the 
bright morning. But I am not satisfied to see the Merapi in such a remote 
place. I have to invite the readers to go closer and closer until to the post of 
vulcanology observatory. Here, Merapi is not as beautiful as it is seen from 
Ambarukmo Hotel, as we clearly see the precipitous hill and also the smell 
of vulcanite. Certainly, we are here not looking for beauty, but for reality. 
(Sjadzali 1990: 170)
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Sjadzali wants to argue that too much idealization of the early experi-
ence of Muslim politics is extremely dangerous, for one thing that politics, 
wherever and whenever it is, is not free from intrigues and interests. How 
could we say that the early life of Islamic politics was a good example if 
we know that conflicts and wars were part of the daily life of the Prophet 
and the last three caliphs of the 'guided caliphs' were brutally killed? 
All these things, Sjadzali argues, are only to ascertain us that the early 
Muslims were no more than 'political animals, as we can find in every 
stage of history. They were not super human' (Sjadzali 1990: 234).
Conclusion
The rejection of the concept of Islamic state or the state based on Islam 
is crucial for the development of democracy in Indonesia. It has truly 
paved the way for Muslims to be more independent and more rational in 
dealing with political matters. In the past, santri Muslims were daunted 
by religious ideology in that it was almost impossible for them to think 
politically outside a religious framework. Even if they thought about 
democracy, they understood it within the framework of religious think-
ing, which at the end only accentuated their religious identity rather than 
speaking of a real democracy. However, new arguments set by younger 
generation have eased the burden of Indonesian Muslims confidently 
to leave their old political paradigm and unhesitatingly to accept the 
true meaning of democracy.
Luthfi Assyaukanie is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Melbourne and Research 
Fellow at Freedom Institute, Jakarta.
NOTES
1   We are not talking about general elections during the Soeharto era, mainly because 
they were not fairly conducted, since the military regime had intervened in all 
political processes in the country. In addition, there was no independent Islamic 
party during this period of time, particularly after the implementation of the sole 
basis (asas tunggal) in 1984.
2   'Muslim modernists' usually refers to a group of intellectuals who were educated 
in modern institutions and were affiliated to the modern organizations. Muham-
madiyah and most of the Masyumi leaders were often regarded as modernists, 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) members as traditionalists.
3   Mohammad Natsir (1908-93) was the most important figure of the old Muslim 
generation. He was not only the one who introduced the term 'Islamic Democratic 
State', but also the most consistent leader supporting this idea. Natsir was a thinker 
44  The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 20•2004
Luthfi Assyaukanie
as well as a politician. He had written on political issues since he was a student in 
Bandung. Formally, he studied in Algemeene Middelbare School (AMS), a Dutch high 
school, but informally studied Islam with Ahmad Hassan (1887-1962), the charismatic 
leader of Persatuan Islam (Persis). Although he only graduated from AMS, Natsir 
was a brilliant autodidact. He mastered six foreign languages: Latin, Dutch, German, 
French, English, and Arabic. Natsir did not write a book. However, his articles which 
he wrote since his youth have been collected into several books. The two volume 
collections, Capita Selecta, are unquestionably his most important work. From 1949 
to 1958, Natsir chaired Masyumi and was elected Prime Minister in 1950.
4   Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911-83) was politically affiliated to Masyumi. He was born 
in Minangkabau and educated in Padang Pandjang. In 1935, he edited a magazine 
called Pandji Islam. It was under his editorship that the long familiar debates be-
tween Soekarno and Natsir took place. Zainal Abidin was more of an intellectual 
and academician than a politician. Unlike Natsir, he wrote several books and was 
deeply involved in several educational institutions. In his later age, he held the 
position of President of the Institute of Qur'anic Science (PTIQ), a prestigious col-
lege of Qur'anic studies in Jakarta. Zainal Abidin was much interested in political 
philosophy and wrote mostly on political thought. His best work, Membentuk Negara 
Islam (Building an Islamic State), is a conceptual blueprint of the Islamic model of 
democratic state.
5   BPUPKI stands for Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(committee to prepare for Indonesian Independence). This committee was founded 
on 1 March 1945 and held its first meeting from 2 May until 1 June.
6   Like the distinction of citizen or non-citizen (warga negara Indonesia, WNI) and for-
eign citizen (warga negara asing, WNA), or Indonesian citizen by birth (warga negara 
Indonesia keturunan, WNI Keturunan). These are all for administrative purposes.
7   Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-89) was born in Serang, Banten, from a santri aris-
tocrat family. His father was a Dutch ambtenaar (pangreh praja officer) and was fairly 
Westernized. Like Natsir, Sjafruddin studied in AMS in Bandung and continued to 
RHS (Rechts Hoge School), a Dutch school of law, in Jakarta. Although he graduated in 
Law and was more interested in Literature, Sjafruddin was asked to work in Departe-
ment van Financien (Financial Department). After independence, he was appointed 
Minister of Finance in the Sjahrir's third cabinet (1946). After some other ministerial 
posts, Sjafruddin was appointed as the first Director of Indonesian Bank. His other 
important political roles were as the head of the Emergent Government of the Re-
public of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Darurat RI, PDRI) in 1948 and the head of the 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Revolusioner 
RI, PRRI). In spite of his dense political activities, Sjafruddin was a prolific writer. He 
wrote a number of books and various articles on Islam and economic issues.
8   Mohamad Roem (1908-83) was known as an adept diplomat who made the image 
of Masyumi rather high profile. He held various positions in several cabinets. He 
wrote social and political issues in national media, which have now been compiled 
into four volume books entitled Bunga Rampai dari Sejarah.
9   Mohammad Sjafaat Mintaredja was born in Bogor in 1921 and was educated in 
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He was the founder of the Muslim Student 
Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) and was its first chairman (1947-
50). He was also noted for his role as chairman of Parmusi, an Islamic party created 
by the New Order government. His criticism of this concept can be found in his 
writings published in the late 1960s, such as Masjarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia; 
Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran (1971) and Islam dan Politik: Islam dan Negara di 
Indonesia (1976).
45
Democracy and the Islamic State 
10  Amien Rais was born in Solo in 1944. He obtained his master's degree from the 
University of Notre Dame and doctor's degree from the University of Chicago, both 
in political sciences. Since 1998, he has been regarded as the locomotive of reform 
for his role in pushing Soeharto from power. In the same year, he founded a politi-
cal party, a vehicle that brought him to the chairman of the People's Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). In 2004, he joined the race for 
the presidential chair, but he failed.
11   Most of leading figures of Masyumi were still alive at the time. They include M. 
Natsir, Hamka, Zainal Abidin Ahmad and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara.
12    In his letter, Madjid admitted that he was somewhat surprised by Amien's statement 
since the latter had been well known as an Islamic activist whose ideas tended to 
be conservative rather than liberal.
13  Sjadzali was born in Klaten, Central Java, in 1925. He was educated in Solo and 
completed his advanced study in Mamba al-'Ulum in the same city. He took his 
BA from Exeter University in diplomatic studies and obtained his master's degree 
from Georgetown University in political science. Before serving as a Minister, he 
served as Ambassador in Kuwait.
14  This book has been translated into English under the title Islam and Governmental 
System: Teachings, History, and Reflections. Jakarta: INIS, 1991. One of Sjadzali's cru-
cial moves during his service as Minister of Religion was to introduce the idea of 
what he calls 'reactualization.' What he means by 'reactualization' is an attempt to 
review and rethink primary Islamic sources, particularly the Qur'an, in order to 
give a new understanding which is more authentic and more compatible to the 
spirit of the age. The criticism of the idea of an Islamic state was part of Sjadzali's 
project of reactualization. See intellectual responses of his idea in his book: Polemik 
Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam (1988).
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